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ON IDENTITIES IN MODERN NETWORKS
Libor Polčák, Radek Hranický, and Tomáš Martı́nek
Faculty of Information Technology, Brno University of Technology
Božetěchova 2, 612 66 Brno, Czech Republic
{ipolcak, ihranicky, martinto}@fit.vutbr.cz

ABSTRACT
Communicating parties inside computer networks use different kind of identifiers. Some of these
identifiers are stable, e.g., logins used to access a specific service, some are only temporary, e.g.,
dynamically assigned IP addresses. This paper tackles several challenges of lawful interception that
emerged in modern networks. The main contribution is the graph model that links identities learnt
from various sources distributed in a network. The inferred identities result into an interception
of more detailed data in conformance with the issued court order. The approach deals with network address translation, short-lived identifiers and simultaneous usage of different identities. The
approach was evaluated to be viable during real network testing based on various means to learn
identities of users connected to a network.
Keywords: lawful interception, intercept related information, content of communication, user
identities, identification, linkability.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Besides peaceful activities, computer networks
are used for illegal actions or for communication of law offenders. Lawful interception (LI)
(ATIS/TIA, 2006; ETSI, 2001) aims at gathering evidence from computer network communication. A court order may impose network
operators or service providers to intercept all
communication of a suspect. The collected evidence is later analysed by a Law Enforcement
Agency (LEA). The evidence has to be indisputable and complete so that it can be used in
a court room.
European standards for LI (ETSI, 2006) define reference architecture of a LI System (LIS).
The entity carrying an interception in its network can be ordered to pass meta data about
the communication of the interception target,
i.e., discovered information about their network
identifiers in a form of Intercept Related Information (IRI). In addition, the entity can be
obliged to provide a copy of the communication of a suspect – Content of Communication
c 2014 ADFSL

(CC). The reference architecture embodies Internal Interception Function (IIF) divided into
IRI-IIF and CC-IIF. IRI-IIF monitors the network and creates IRIs; CC-IIF copies the flows
of a suspect in the form of CCs.
This paper proposes a model based on the
graph theory that addresses several challenges
that LI faces in modern networks. Firstly,
the imminent exhaustion of IPv4 address space
stimulated the increased need for network address translators (NATs) that often translate
IPv4 addresses of several computers to only one
IPv4 address and, consequently, conserves the
IPv4 address space. However, the translation
hinders the identification.
As of writing of this paper, four of the
five regional registrars (all except the African
AFRINIC) are already in the state in which
IPv4 addresses are allocated according to very
strict policies. The replacement, IPv6, poses
several new challenges for LI. Firstly, a computer can generate thousands of IPv6 addresses
and use them for simultaneous communication
Page 9
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(Narten, Draves, & Krishnan, 2007). Secondly,
IPv6-enabled computers are often dual stacked
and can intermix both IPv4 and IPv6 communication even for a single session (Sanguanpong &
Koht-Arsa, 2013; Wing & Yourtchenko, 2012).
The model described in this paper handles
both NAT and IPv6. More importantly, it can
link all IPv4 and IPv6 identities and provide
complete data in compliance with the court order.
The trend of last years is to bring application layer awareness into LI (AQSACOM, 2012;
Hoffman & Terplan, 2006; Utimaco Safeware
AG, 2010; Yang & Liu, 2013). Although the
predominant protocols are related to e-mail and
Voice over IP (VoIP), other protocols are also
considered. Nevertheless, ETSI defines only
application layer LI for e-mail (ETSI, 2010a)
and multimedia services including VoIP (ETSI,
2010b). The model proposed in this paper is
generic and it can be used with a range of application protocols.
Our solution deals with the challenges related
to multiple identities (Pfitzmann & Hansen,
2010), determined by IP addresses, MAC addresses, application level identifiers, switch
ports etc., by creating a graph of the network
state. Discovered identifiers are stored as vertices. When two network identifiers are related,
e.g., both belong to the same computer or person, there is an edge between the vertices in
the graph. In addition, the vertices are categorised according to their relevance into several
types, and consequently, our solution may link
the identities and intercept all data allowed by
a court order depending on its wording. The
graph is built based on information learnt by
modules scattered in the network. The modules
discover identities from various sources, including network traffic and a cooperation with third
party programs.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2
lists the challenges in modern LI and explains
how the proposed LI architecture addresses the
challenges. Section 3 expands the architecture
of a LIS and discusses possible sources of information in the network. Section 4 provides a
formal model for inferring identities from variPage 10
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ous sources. We created a proof-of-concept LIS
based on the guidelines and evaluated it in Section 5. Related work is discussed in Section 6.
Section 7 proposes future work and Section 8
concludes the paper.

2.

CHALLENGES

This section discusses the challenges of LI
within modern networks. Additionally, it explains the contribution of this paper, i.e., how
it helps in solving these challenges.

2.1

Challenges in IPv4 Networks

The shortage of IPv4 addresses starts to be visible in modern networks. In the past, home
networks were usually assigned one public IPv4
address. Today, carrier grade NAT (CGN) or
multi-layer NAT depicted in Figure 1 are becoming common. In such networks, home networks cannot be identified by a public IPv4 address. Instead, each flow has to be handled separately as flows originating from a single local
address can be translated to more public IP addresses and several local IP addresses usually
share a pool of public IP addresses. The proposed model contains extensions (Section 4.5)
for networks with NAT, which handle all remote
communication in NATed networks on the flow
level.

NAT
Same public
address

Carrier
Grade NAT

Internet

Public addresses
Different public
address

10.0.0.0/24

ISP
100.64.0.0/10

192.168.0.0/24

192.168.1.0/24

192.168.0.0/24 10.0.0.0/24

Figure 1 Multiple layers of NAT are becoming
frequent in modern networks.
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Date and time
Single computer
fe80::c62c:3ff:fe36:4f4d
147.229.3.105
2001:67c:1220:3:acba:a1b6:6b14:6ae8
2001:67c:1220:3:c62c:3ff:fe36:4f4d
2001:67c:1220:3:1c24:7a45:f76a:7b26
2001:67c:1220:3:257b:73f6:b78c:5ef0
2001:67c:1220:3:492d:5082:1cb5:a193
2001:67c:1220:3:50e4:eb41:56bd:598d
2001:67c:1220:3:51af:e544:fb4b:a193
2001:67c:1220:3:8094:f5a7:26a0:9427
2001:67c:1220:3:90b5:33f:47da:4e16

IPv6 addresses:

Link-local

EUI64-based

RFC 4941-based

IPv4

Figure 2 Multiple IPv6 addresses were used during a week by a single Windows-based computer
simultaneously. The computer was not shut down during that week. While it used only one IPv4
address, it generated a new IPv6 address every day. The bars show the time periods when the
addresses were actively used in the network.

2.2

Challenges in IPv6 Networks

IPv6 introduced (Narten et al., 2007) shortlived temporary addresses that can be generated by any computer in an IPv6 network at
will. Moreover, a computer can use as many
IPv6 addresses on each interface as it can handle. Furthermore, recent versions of Windows,
Mac OS X, iOS, and several Linux distributions
have temporary addresses enabled by default.
Usually, a new temporary address is generated
at least once per day. However, when a user
authenticates with a different access point in a
Wi-Fi network or reboots his or her computer,
it regenerates its temporary addresses. Figure 2
portrays default behaviour of a Windows computer.
Usually, even in IPv6-enabled networks, IPv4
is still present (as also illustrated in Figure 2).
Recent operating systems and web browsers employ a mechanism called Happy eyeballs (HE)
(Wing & Yourtchenko, 2012). HE keeps a
record of the responsiveness of internet servers
via IPv4 and IPv6. Based on the record, HE
dynamically shifts between IPv4 and IPv6 and
selects the protocol with better performance
(sometimes with a slight preference of IPv6).
As a result, one session (e.g., web session) can
be split between both protocols.
c 2014 ADFSL

In addition, even without HE, dual-stacked
machines communicate with IPv4-only Internet
using IPv4 while IPv6-enabled servers are accessed via IPv6. As web pages often contain external content and DNS is accessed separately,
one session may be split between IPv4 and IPv6
even without HE.
The proposed LIS deals with multiple identities in two ways. Firstly, we evaluated (Polčák,
Holkovič, & Matoušek, 2013) several methods
for learning the IPv6 addresses of one computer;
including the detection of short-lived addresses.
Secondly, the proposed graph model in Section
4.2 does not impose any limits on the number
of IP addresses known for a single computer.
Moreover, the proposed algorithms are aware of
the possibility of a computer having multiple
addresses learnt from different sources. Consequently, the proposed LIS can intercept data of
all identities of one computer.
Overlay networks are built on top of the
standard networks.
Transition mechanisms
(Carpenter, 2001; Despres, 2010; Huitema,
2006) aim at connecting IPv6 islands to the
main IPv6 Internet through IPv4-only network.
Consider the user in the IPv4 network in the
Figure 3. The end host encapsulates IPv6 datagrams into IPv4 datagrams (depending on the
Page 11
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method either directly or using more protocols,
e.g., UDP). The IPv6 datagrams are decapsulated by a specific node that provides the transition between IPv4 and IPv6 networks. The
observed IP addresses can identify middle boxes
instead of the real communicating party.
IPv4 datagram
IPv6
datagram

IPv6
datagram

IPv4

IPv6

Figure 3 Tunneling is often used to extend IPv6
networks through IPv4-only networks.

2.3

Other Challenges

There are several kinds of court-approved interceptions. Sometimes it is allowed to intercept
only data of a specific IP address. On other occasions, all traffic of a specific computer or of a
specific user has to be intercepted. Some court
orders allow to link identities whereas other
court orders do not. The Scopes established in
Section 4.1 address the issue of the wording of
a court order.
An interception can target a specific application layer protocol, e.g., SIP (voice), e-mail
or HTTP (web access). The proposed system
is distributed and supports different sources of
identities. Additionally, our research group develops FPGA-based probes. The goal is to integrate application level parsing into a high speed
FPGA-based probe. However, the description
of the probes is out-of-scope of this paper. Section 3 lists possible IAPs for deployment of LI
probes in a network.
Cronin et al.
(Cronin, Sherr, & Blaze,
2008) reported the problems related to packetswitched networks. They discussed confusion
and evasion of detection. Confusion occurs
when a surveillance system detects data transmissions but it is deceived into decoding false information. Evasion of detection happens when a
surveillance oversights the communication. The
proposed distribution of intercept access points
Page 12

(IAPs), i.e., the points in the network where
the traffic is analysed or captured, addresses
both confusion and evasion. The details are explained in Section 3.
Recently, new paradigms to control network,
such as Software Defined Networking (SDN)
(McKeown et al., 2008) and various overlay networks emerged. The modular approach to identity detection allows various sources of information. As a proof-of-concept, the LIS evaluated
in Section 5 gathers information about the network from an SDN controller.
High mobility of users and recent growth of
mobile devices connected to the Internet brings
yet another challenge to LI. While we do not
address this issue in detail in the paper, the
modular input for identities can be in principle used in sharing information about identities
of mobile users across several networks.
Last but not least, encryption is a major challenge for LI. Encrypted flows cannot be parsed
on their path from source to destination without the knowledge of keys or a shared secret.
Since the possibility of having scattered sources
of information about identities is covered in the
architecture described in Section 3, the architecture can deal with encryption in case the identities are learnt in cooperation with the accessed
services.

3.

LEARNING IDENTITIES

This section describes the proposed approach
that deals with the challenges in LI performed
in modern networks listed in Section 2. The described model enhances the reference architecture (ETSI, 2006), mostly IRI-IIF and partially
CC-IIF.
The focus of IRI-IIF is on meta data while
CC-IIF copies the traffic. Therefore, IRI-IIF
needs to be optimized for parsing network traffic
and dealing with specific protocols while CCIIF needs to mirror the traffic to the Mediation
Function (ETSI, 2006) data store.
We augment a detailed architecture of IRIIIF. The architecture comprises of several parts:
• IRI-Core holds a centralised view on the
c 2014 ADFSL
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Internet provider
Customer 1

DHCP/
RADIUS

Telephone
manager

Customer 2

Internet

Customer n

CC-probes IAP

LIS Central Device
Mail
server

Service specific IRI-probe IAP
Application layer IRI-probe IAP

Figure 4 An example of a deployment of different Intercept Access Points (IAPs) in the network of
an Internet access provider.
network. The proposed graph model is constructed by IRI-Core.
• Application layer modules parse all network
traffic (they see) and pass discovered network identifiers and relations between them
to IRI-Core.
• Specific service modules are distributed to
specific positions in the network. Each
module discovers mappings between network identifiers from a single protocol, e.g.,
DHCP, RADIUS, IPv6 neighbor discovery. The information is passed to IRICore. Both internal (module integrated to
the service process) and external (passive
monitoring of a mirrored or tapped traffic)
modules are possible.
As CC-IIF needs to select the traffic for interception on wire speed, a CC-IIF probe has
to identify the traffic quickly. Since network
layer identifiers are preserved across the path
(except NAT) and flows can be identified by
an IP address pair and port number pair, the
proposed method use these two types of identifiers to select the traffic to be intercepted by
CC-IIF. Another benefit is that these identifiers
are broadly supported by network gear manufacturers (e.g., access control lists supported by
c 2014 ADFSL

Cisco, Juniper, HP, etc.) and protocols for network control (e.g., OpenFlow).
Figure 4 shows an example network topology
of an Internet provider. Its customers are connected to the core network. The core network
is connected to the Internet with multiple edge
routers.
A specific service module of IRI-IIF should
be located near its corresponding service server
if it is possible (e.g., DHCP, RADIUS) or distributed in the core network in relevant locations, e.g., IPv6 neighbor discovery (Polčák et
al., 2013).
As the services (VoIP, e-mail, etc.) are usually located outside of the network, application
layer modules monitor Intercept Access Points
(IAPs) at the edge of the network. However,
if these services were located in the Internet
provider’s network, a specific service module
can be deployed on the link to the service or
integrated on the server (similarly to the IAP
near the RADIUS/DHCP server). IRI-Core is
a part of the central device.
The idea behind the location of IRI-IIF IAPs
is to move them close to the provided service
to avoid traffic confusion (Cronin et al., 2008).
Ideally, IRI-IIF IAPs are integrated within the
service process. In this case, the identities seen
by the LIS are guaranteed to be the same as
Page 13

JDFSL V9N2

On Identities in Modern Networks

those registered with the service. Moreover,
traffic encryption is also not a problem since
the service process decrypts the traffic.
However, the integration often cannot be
achieved in practice. Two reasons prevail.
1) The service is located outside of the jurisdiction of the LEA interested in the LI. 2) The
service provider is concerned about the stability and performance of LI plug-ins. The IRI-IIF
IAPs depicted in Figure 4 on the edge of the Internet provider network address the former issue. The IRI-IIF IAPs located near the service
deals with the latter.
The IAPs for CC data needs to be located
as close to the interception target as possible
(Cronin et al., 2008). With CC-IIF IAPs in the
access part of the network, it is possible to intercept even data that are exchanged between two
customers, e.g., RTP part of a SIP call carried
between the callers in the peer-to-peer manner.
In addition, the interception is not limited to
data of a specific service but broader scope of
interception can be triggered when the identity
of a target is discovered. See Section 4 for details.

4.

TARGETING THE
INTERCEPTION

An LI has to comply with law regulations and
a specific court order. Whereas the regulations
are quite stable, the wording of a court order
may differ on a case-by-case basis. Sometimes
a LEA knows a network identifier used by the
interception target in the past (e-mail address,
IP address, etc.) and it is interested in all communication of the same person. On other occasions, LEAs are interested only in the communication identified by a specific identifier. This
section deals with the issues arising from the
wording of court orders of interceptions and introduces a graph-based view on the state of the
network and algorithms to select the network
identifiers for an interception.

4.1

Interception Scope

From the interviews with representatives of
LEAs in our country, we have identified three
Page 14

Scopes of interception:
1= Specific identifier : intercepts just the communication directly identified by the given
identifier.
2= Specific computer : intercepts all communication of a computer that is related to the
given identity. For example, this Scope intercepts IPv6 traffic of a computer identified by an IPv4 address or it intercepts all
traffic of a computer when a given e-mail
address was used by that computer.
3= Specific user : intercepts all traffic of a specific user, e.g., when his or her identity is
disclosed by an application layer identifier,
or, when he or she authenticates with RADIUS or other authentication technique.
The defined Scopes treats network identifiers
in a different manner depending on their meaning. We identified five Categories of network
identifiers:
α= Flows defined by a 5-tuple consisting of:
• local and remote IP address,
• transport level protocol identifier,
e.g., TCP or UDP,
• local and remote port number.
β= Network layer addresses, e.g., IPv4 or IPv6
addresses.
γ= Physical layer interface addresses, e.g.,
MAC addresses; and any other identifiers specifying a unique computer, e.g.,
DHCPv6 DUID.
δ= Authentication user names (RADIUS,
PPP, etc.).
λ= Application level identifiers (login, SIP id,
e-mail address, etc.).
Let us define the set of Categories, C =
{α, β, γ, δ, λ}, and the partial ordering δ > γ >
β > α and λ > α; meaning α has the narrowest
coverage whereas δ and λ represent the broadest
c 2014 ADFSL
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RADIUSLogin: r

PPPLogin: p

Category δ

PPPoE

RADIUS

Category γ

RADIUS

PPPoE

MAC: y
RADIUS SLAAC

Category β

IPv4:s

IPv4:q

DUID: h

MAC: x
DHCP

IPv6:p

SLAAC

IPv4: a

DHCPv6
IPv6: b

IPv6:c

behaviour traits
XMPP (server)

Category α

XMPP

XMPP
TCP: IPv4: a, IPv4: s (server), port: n1, port: n2

XMPP: L

Category λ

Figure 5 An example graph of a network state.
coverage. For example, a user can authenticate
a few devices, each of them having a specific IP
address (Category β identifier), using only one
token (Category δ identifier). Another example
is an interface with one physical address (Category γ) initiating connections using more than
one IP address (as discussed in Section 2). The
final example is a user signed to a service using a login of Category λ on a private phone
and a shared computer. Each device carries the
communication in separate Category α flows.

4.2

Graph Interception Model

To enable interceptions of the above defined
Scopes, we propose to manage a graph model
of the identities known in a specific state of
the network.
The identities are identified
(Pfitzmann & Hansen, 2010) by identifiers of
the specified Categories. The graph model of
the state is defined by the following undirected
graph S = (V, E, p, l) where:
• V is a set of vertices. Every vertex represents a network identifier.
• E ⊆ V × V is the symmetric adjacency relation between the vertices.
• p : E → P is a total function that maps
each edge to a protocol from a set of
all supported protocols P . For example,
p((K.L.M.N, x@y)) yields SMTP if the relation of an IP address K.L.M.N and an
e-mail address x@y was learnt from SMTP.
c 2014 ADFSL

• l : V → C is a total function that maps
each vertex to its Category.
When a LIS has to determine CC-IIF identifiers (IP addresses or flow identifiers) for a given
interception target identified by a network identifier i, there has to be a node v ∈ V in the state
graph, such as v represents i. If there is no such
v, i is not known to be present in the network
and there are no data to be intercepted. The following text treats terms network identifier and
vertex interchangeably.

4.3

Network State Example

Let us consider the graph depicted in Figure 5.
A user with a PPP login p connected two computers to the network; one of the computers
is authenticated with a RADIUS server. Both
computers have several IP addresses obtained
from different sources (DHCP, DHCPv6, RADIUS) or automatically generated by the computers (SLAAC). DHCPv6 uses a special identifier called DUID that does not have to be related
to the MAC address of the computer. Nevertheless, it is possible to detect the relation between
IPv6 addresses b and c from other sources, e.g.,
behavioural analysis, switch port etc. Additionally, the user opened an XMPP connection to a
server s using the IP address a. Note that the
relation between the Category α identifier and
IP address s is dashed, meaning that it is not
actually a part of E, and consequently, it is not
used to link identities.
Let us demonstrate the scope of interceptions
targeted on XMPP login L (Scopes 1, 2, and 3)
Page 15
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and IPv4 address q (Scopes 1’ and 2’) in Figure 6.
Scope 1 interceptions gather only data identified by the target identifier and related identifier in its coverage. Therefore, the interception
aimed at the XMPP login L covers the flow related to the L but other traffic of the IP address
a is not intercepted. Correspondingly, the other
interception of q gathers packets containing the
IP address q, other packets of these computers
are ignored.
In contrast, the Scope 2 interceptions cover
all identifiers of a specific computer. Specifically, the interception targeted on the login L
covers all identities related to and only to the
computer in the right, including IP addresses
a, b, and c and the XMPP flow. Similarly,
the interception targeted on IPv4 address q includes the other IP address p of the left computer but the right computer does not belong
to the Scope.
Scope 3 aims on specific users. The intercept
targeting XMPP login L aims only on the flows
that are a part of a session related to L. As the
IP address of q does not represent an identity
of a user, Scope 3’ interception is not defined.

4.4

Definitions of Graph Operations

When a vertex v exists for an identifier i that
should be intercepted, it is necessary to determine all identifiers that are relevant to the intercept according to the specified Scopes 1–3.
Let us define a function capture : V → 2V that
yields the relevant identifiers for a capture targeted at any given v ∈ V .
Firstly, let us define binary relations used to
construct capture. The Formula 1 defines the
antisymmetric binary relation covers ⊆ V × V .
Vertices x and y are related in case they are
directly connected and y is of a narrower Category.
The Formula 2 defines the binary relations
linkedc ⊆ V × V , one for each c ∈ C. A vertex
x is in relation linkedc with a vertex y if they
are directly connected by an edge and vertex y
is of the Category c or narrower. Note that the
network state cannot contain edges between an
IP address of a server and a flow of the Category
Page 16

On Identities in Modern Networks

α so that it is not possible to cross to a domain
of another computer. If this condition holds,
the reflexive and transitive closure linked∗c does
not link the identities of other communicating
parties through flows and servers.
Finally, let us define capture in Formula 3
using the reflexive and transitive closure of the
relations covers and linkedc for c ∈ {γ, δ, λ}.
As stated in Section 3, the proposed LIS architecture aims only at intercepting data according to identifiers from Category α or β.
Therefore the final captureCC function is defined in Formula 4. However, the results of
capture are more generic since they can be used
even without these limitations.

4.5

Considerations for Network
Address Translators

The described model is suitable for networks
without network address translation (NAT).
However, when NAT is located in between the
IRI-IIF IAP and the CC-IIF IAP, several issues
has to be considered. Fortunately, the issues
can be addressed with specific rules during a
network state graph construction:
1. The graph cannot contain edges between
the public nodes of Category β, γ, δ or λ
and a node of Category α, e.g., a public IP
address or application login and the corresponding flow (similarly to edges between
a flow and its server address).
2. In contrast, following edges have to be
added when a local flow a is translated to
a public flow b:
(a) an edge between flow a and b;
(b) an edge between flow a and:
• related local identifiers of Categories β and γ (public identifiers
belongs to the translator),
• all related identifiers of Categories δ and λ.
3. There is no edge between local flow a and
the remote server IP address.
c 2014 ADFSL
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RADIUSLogin: r

PPPLogin: p

2
Category γ

2'

MAC: y

DUID: h

MAC: x

1'
Category β

IPv4:q

IPv6:p

IPv4: a

1=3
Category α

TCP: IPv4: a, IPv4: s (server), port: n1, port: n2

IPv6: b

IPv6:c

Category λ
XMPP: L

Figure 6 An example of intercepts in the network state.
covers = {(x, y) ∈ V 2 : (x, y) ∈ E ∧ l(x) > l(y)}.

linkedc = {(x, y) ∈ V 2 : (x, y) ∈ E ∧ l(y) ≤ c}.

{x ∈ V : v covers∗ x}
{x ∈ V : v linked∗γ x}
capture(v) =

{x ∈ V : v linked∗l(v) x}



: Scope 1 (specific identifier),
: Scope 2 (specific computer),
: Scope 3 (specific user) and l(v) ∈ {δ, λ}.

(1)

(2)

(3)

captureCC (v) = {x ∈ V : x ∈ capture(v) ∧ l(x) ∈ {α, β}}.

(4)

capture(v) = {x ∈ V : v(covers ∪ linkedα )∗ x} : Scope 1 in the NAT scenario.

(5)

Since these rules insert edges connecting local
and remote flows, a slightly updated version of
capture has to be applied in the Scope 1 case
(for other Scopes, Formula 3 still applies). The
updated version is defined by the Formula 5.
Figure 7 illustrates the above mentioned rules
on an example of a SIP call. A user identified
with a private IPv4 address local is registered
with a remote server s and the user is calling
another user on IP address r. These two flows
are identified by NAT. Since the dashed edges
in Figure 7 are not considered by the function
capture (defined in formulae 3 and 5), the computer shown in Figure 7 cannot be linked with
another computer that happens to have its IP
address translated to the same public address.
c 2014 ADFSL

The function capture yields the correct results according to the specified Scope of the interception. For example, the interception can
be targeted on the access login to the network
(PPPLogin p). Flows with both local and public IP address of the target user machine are
returned by the function capture while only
the local address Category β identifier is returned. The returned vertices are the same
for all Scopes; they are shown with the colored
background.
The benefit is that the identifiers yielded by
capture can be used by a CC-IIF probe in any
location in the network, inside or outside of the
NATed network. In the example in Figure 7, a
probe outside of the NATed network captures
Page 17
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Public identifiers
Cat. λ

SIP: L

NAT (2b)

NAT (2b)
SIP (1)

Cat. β
IPv4:r

NAT (3)

Cat. α

SIP (server)
NAT (3)

SIP (1)

SIP (server)

IPv4:s

IPv4:public

SIP (1)

SIP (1)
RTP: IPv4: public, IPv4: r (remote), port: n3, port: n4
NAT (2a)

NATUDP: IPv4: local, IPv4: r (remote), port: n3', port: n4

TCP: IPv4: public, IPv4: s(server), port: n1, port: n2
SIP

NAT (2a)
NATTCP: IPv4: local, IPv4: s(server), port: n1', port: n2

Cat. α
NAT (2b)

NAT (2b)

Cat. β

IPv4:local
PPPoE

Cat. δ
Local/private identifiers

PPPLogin: p

Figure 7 An example of a network state with NAT. The rules for a presence or an omission of an
edge are referred.
according to the public identifiers (flows in the
upper part of the Figure 7). Such a probe does
not see any traffic identified by the private network identifiers depicted in the lower part of
the Figure 7. On the other hand a probe located inside of the NATed network sees just the
identifiers displayed in the bottom part of the
Figure 7.
Note that the specific service module for NAT
has to advertise the network translation on the
flow level.

5.

PROOF-OF-CONCEPT

To evaluate the proposed architecture, we implemented a LIS following the approach introduced in this paper. Intercept Related Information – Internal Interception Function (IRI-IIF)
(ETSI, 2006) in the LIS is highly modular and
modules for specific protocols can be distributed
across the network. The discovered identities of
various protocols can be linked and the Scope
of an intercept can be defined according to the
wording of the court order for the intercept.
All three interception Scopes introduced in Section 4 are supported.
As the number of protocols used in networking is high, we had to limit the number of protocols that we evaluated in our proof-of-concept
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LIS. The goal was to show that the proposed solution is viable for:
• protocols for authentication (RADIUS);
• protocols used to access the Internet from
households (PPPoE used in ADSL);
• linkability of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of
the same computer, addresses are learnt
from DHCP, DHCPv6, neighbor discovery
(Polčák et al., 2013), and OpenDaylight
controller;
• application layer protocols (instant messaging, e-mail etc.);
• cooperation with third party programs (in
our case, we include OpenDaylight SDN
controller as a source of information about
computers in the network: IP addresses
and location of computers in the network).
The Figure 8 shows the various modules that
were deployed in our laboratory environment
and University networks during our evaluations.
All modules passed the detected identifiers to
the central device where they were linked and
the graph of the current state of the network
was constructed.
c 2014 ADFSL
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OpenDaylight plug-in

Figure 8 The ETSI IRI-IIF architecture deployed during the testing.

modules has to provide accurate data to
the IRI-Core. When some identities are
not known inside IRI-Core, data related
to these identities might evade the interception. In contrast, incorrect detection
of identities might link unrelated identities
and consequently, packets related to the
incorrectly linked identities might be captured as a part of one interception.

The Table 1 shows the identifiers and their
Categories that we evaluated.

• CC-probes has to see all traffic that can be
a part of an interception. Moreover, the
probes has to capture data on wire-speed.

PPPoE

RADIUS

IRI-Core
(Linking of identities)

IPv6 Neighbor Discovery

DHCP

DHCPv6

Table 1 Network identifiers supported by the
proof-of-concept LIS.
Category
α
β
γ
δ
λ

Identifiers
TCP flow
IPv4 and IPv6 address
MAC address, DHCPv6 DUID
PPP login and session;
RADIUS login
e-mail address;
OSCAR, YMSG, and XMPP login;
IRC login and channel

During the testing, we connected devices
under our control and checked that the assigned identifiers were registered by IRI-IIF located at the central device. Additionally, we
checked that the detected identifiers were correctly linked, including the IP addresses simultaneously used by a single computer. Later, we
initiated several application layer sessions and
again checked that the flows were correctly represented in the graph. The testing was successful as we were able to link the identities of our
computers and testing users gathered from various sources.
Finally, we configured our 1 and 10 Gbps
probes distributed in the testing network. As all
traffic of the computers under test flew through
the probes, the probes captured all packets related to the configured interceptions.
However, the quality of interceptions in reallife scenario depends on several factors:
• The application layer and specific service
c 2014 ADFSL

In addition, the definition of capture for
level 3 interceptions (in the Formula 3) aimed
on Category λ identifiers yields only the identities directly linkable to the input Category λ
identifier. As a consequence, data produced by
the same user in a different application are not
intercepted (unless there is a module that links
the identifiers in the graph). Depending on the
aim of the interception, this might be in conformance with the wording of the interception, or,
data produced by the other applications might
be incorrectly missing.

6.

RELATED WORK

This work is primarily based on ETSI standards for lawful interception (LI) (ETSI, 2001,
2006, 2010a, 2010b). These standards specify
a generic architecture, which is in nature very
similar to U.S. ATIS/TIA (2006) standards for
CALEA-based LI. We detailed the architecture
of Intercept Related Information – Internal Interception Function (IRI-IIF) (ETSI, 2006) that
detects identities in the network.
The proposed approach of learning the identities in a distributed manner is compatible with
other solutions with roots in ETSI or ATIS/TIA
standards, such as the architecture of Cisco Systems (Baker, Foster, & Sharp, 2004), Aqsacom
ALIS (AQSACOM, 2012) or UTIMACO LIMS
(Utimaco Safeware AG, 2010). In comparison
to these works, we list more challenges, namely
related to IPv6. Additionally, we propose solutions for their concerns, especially those related
to target identification.
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Other previously proposed monitoring architectures for LI (Karpagavinayagam, State, &
Festor, 2007; Milanović et al., 2003; Yang &
Liu, 2013) were tailored for specific protocols,
mostly voice related. The architecture used in
this paper is generic and it is suitable for identifiers from all networking layers.
This work addresses the concerns of Cronin
et al. (2008) related to confusion and detection
of evasion from LI by locating the identity detection probes as close to the accessed service
as possible while CC-probes are located close to
the target.

7.

FUTURE WORK

Currently, our research group is working on several extensions for the described LIS. Firstly,
high-speed networks require hardware-based solutions for LI. The distributed structure of IRIIIF was designed with the expectations of using IRI-probes to gather information about the
identities in the network directly from the network traffic. We are currently working on highspeed FPGA-based 10–100 Gbps probes.
In addition, our research group is working on
the detection of identities in a network with
NAT. This will provide data for the mechanism described in Section 4.5. Furthermore,
we are also working on improvements in local (Polčák et al., 2013) and remote (Polčák
& Franková, 2014) detection of all addresses
used by one computer. The remote detection
includes unique traits of specific computers.
Furthermore, we are investigating the advantages that SDN brings to LI. Not only can
SDN-switches be used as an IAP for CC, but
the knowledge of network topology can also be
utilised for lawful interception, e.g., to adjust
the configuration of specific probes in the network based on the up-to-date topology.
Finally, our colleagues are working on tools
for decoding of intercepted data.

8.

SUMMARY

LI faces several challenges in modern networks.
The shortage of IPv4 addresses results in extensive use of network address translation and
Page 20

the arrival of IPv6, a successor of IPv4. Consequently, a single computer simultaneously uses
more than one IP address for its communication. In addition, interception of application
protocols is becoming common. However, the
services are often provided abroad, outside of
the jurisdiction of a specific LEA. Furthermore,
court-approved interceptions use specific wording for each case.
In this paper, we propose a distributed LIS
that gathers information from various sources.
The identities can be linked according to the
presented algorithms based on the graph theory. The proposed approach is suitable for
modern networks as it tackles the challenges of
network translation, temporary IPv6 addresses,
and simultaneous communication of one computer identified by different IP addresses. The
proposed deployment of network probes aims to
provide as complete data as possible even if the
target accesses a service located outside of the
jurisdiction of a LEA. The linking of identities
can be used to obtain more data in conformance
with the wording of a specific intercept court order.
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